Author: Niu Ltd

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

 

Growth has recovered strongly in 2018-19 but is set to moderate, with the outlook clouded by downside risks. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and individual Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) countries have continued to advance their reform agendas, but progress needs to be accelerated. While robust national fiscal frameworks remain key to the region’s policy priorities, well-sequenced steps to regional integration can catalyze capacity and resources. This would include (i) increasing fiscal integration, (ii) enhancing financial integration, and (iii) solidifying the monetary union by raising payment’s efficiency through—but not limited to—cautiously piloting a digital currency.

1.  Growth rebounded in 2018 and has remained robust so far in 2019. ECCU’s GDP growth accelerated to 3¾ percent in 2018, reflecting buoyant tourism and sizable Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) inflows, which helped support Dominica’s reconstruction-led recovery from the 2017 hurricane. Growth momentum has remained strong in 2019, while inflation has been muted. The region’s fiscal deficits have been edging upwards in 2018-19 despite continued strength in CBI inflows, but with the deficits remaining moderate, the public debt ratio declined in 2018 and is set to fall further in 2019. While the region’s external deficits are high, they are amply financed by FDI flows. Bank credit to the private sector remains weak despite substantial excess liquidity.

2.  Going forward, growth is set to moderate, and risks remain mostly on the downside. GDP growth is expected to gradually ease to 2¼ percent, a long-term historical average for the region. CBI inflows are also projected to moderate. In the near term, economic activity would be supported by further post-hurricane reconstruction, tourism investment, and some agribusiness projects. Achieving the 60 percent of GDP debt target would remain challenging for most countries. Global risks, such as adverse confidence effects from rising protectionism and weaker US growth, could weigh on the outlook. Region-specific risks include natural disasters, increasing banks’ foreign exposures, continuing exit of global banks, and continued pressures on corresponding banking relationships (CBRs) against the backdrop of elevated non-performing assets. Positive surprises in CBI inflows, if well-managed, constitute potential upside risks.

3.  Greater regional integration can substantially complement robust national policies in improving the outlook and mitigating risks. ECCU’s challenges are compounded by large shocks and lack of economies of scale. Robust national fiscal responsibility frameworks that ensure public debt sustainability and buffers are crucial for improving the ECCU growth potential. ECCB’s advocacy for achieving the 60 percent of GDP debt target by 2030 through national fiscal responsibility frameworks and its efforts to improve debt management have supported this process. In addition, IMF staff analysis suggests that well-sequenced steps toward regional integration can catalyze resources for better policy responses, as elaborated below.

A. Increasing Fiscal Integration

4.  Regional coordination of selected revenue policies could create fiscal space for ECCU’s public investment. The ongoing “race to the bottom” in competing for tax incentives and CBI program conditions limits the potential to raise revenue that could be channeled to productive spending, including resilience building. This highlights scope for the ECCU countries to coordinate tax incentives and CBI program conditions, while achieving the objective of making FDI more attractive through better infrastructure. In this context, the authorities’ ongoing collaboration on CBI programs’ financial integrity to improve their transparency and governance could help lower negative perceptions about the use of CBI programs. Such collaboration could support region-wide sustainability of these flows and financial stability.

5.  Over the longer term, a regional pooling of fiscal resources can complement national fiscal buffers to build resilience against natural disasters and other shocks at a lower cost. While individual ECCU countries face similar risks, natural disasters put them in different economic conditions at a given time. The regional pooling of resources saved by limiting excessive growth of public consumption in good times could support macroeconomic stabilization and create scope for resilience building and other growth-enhancing investment in bad times. Staff calculations suggest that the size of a pooled fund would be about one-half of the sum of individual countries’ funds for the same stabilization effect. Such an arrangement would require a strong governance framework and should be financed by national budgets to protect ECCB’s international reserves and the credibility of its quasi-currency board arrangement. This pooling of resources could complement national insurance strategies against natural disasters, a key pillar of the Disaster Resilience Strategies currently being piloted in Dominica and Grenada.

B. Enhancing Financial Integration

6.  Accelerated progress on the ECCB’s reform agenda will help address financial system vulnerabilities. The ECCB in its capacity of a region-wide bank supervisor and regulator has continued to advance essential reforms, including strengthening its financial system stability function with deepened interaction with regional regulatory authorities, identifying regionally-systemic financial institutions, and improvement to its Financial Stability Report. The implementation of risk-based supervision, phase-in of Basel II/III standards, technology upgrades for supervisory operations, and enhanced AML/CFT frameworks continue to build supervisory effectiveness. Additional reforms are currently being pursued, such as establishing a shared services platform for indigenous banks; developing a deposit insurance scheme; implementing an e-conveyancing regime for collateral realization as part of the initiative to modernize insolvency frameworks; harmonizing non-bank financial laws; operationalizing a credit bureau; and preparing guidelines for the treatment of impaired assets. Authorities are also considering a macro-prudential framework for financial sector stability including the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) function; and a framework for optimal regulation of the financial sector.

7.  The reform agenda needs to be prioritized with key short-term actions. Despite improvements in Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in most jurisdictions, efforts to repair bank balance sheets should be stepped up by (i) adopting effective plans for all banks to reduce NPLs below the 5-percent benchmark by end-2023, including via sales to the Eastern Caribbean Asset Management Company (ECAMC); (ii) requiring banks’ disposal of non-banking assets (including land); and (iii) strictly enforcing exposure limits and market risk management. ECCB’s and deposit-taking institutions’ governance frameworks should be reviewed and passage of critical legislation, including AML/CFT, should be expedited by remaining countries to increase compliance and enforcement. Consolidated supervision of financial groups should be advanced. Urgent measures are also necessary to monitor and address operational risk, including due to CBRs and cybersecurity. The new treatment of impaired assets standard, now expected by January 2020, should be implemented without delay.

8.  Provided the critical short-term priorities are addressed, steps toward a fuller banking union could take place in the long term. These would involve: (i) enhancing the financial safety net with a robust deposit insurance scheme and (ii) establishing a regional resolution and crisis management framework. Both these steps require operationalizing credible fiscal backstopping as a key precondition, based on minimum regional fiscal responsibility commitments entrenched in national laws. Other reforms that should be implemented include: (i) advancing the regulatory regime for systemic institutions (including non-banks) to minimize regulatory gaps and shock propagation; (ii) consolidation of regional non-bank financial sector oversight to enhance coverage, address sector-specific risks, reduce compliance costs, and mitigate resource constraints; and (iii) progressing the establishment of a macroprudential mandate and toolkit to address region-wide systemic risk.

C. Solidifying the Currency Union by Raising Payment System’s Efficiency

9.  Building on the successful launch of the Electronic Funds Transfer, the ECCB, national authorities, and financial institutions should continue efforts to modernize the payment system. Major banks have recently begun to offer various electronic payment services. The authorities are also examining options to integrate credit unions in the core payment systems. This would help competition, but it should be considered in the context of establishing an appropriate prudential oversight framework. The ongoing review of the legal framework pertaining to the payment system is also critical to allow emerging Fintech and nonbank e-payment services to operate and innovate. Advancing e-government initiatives would also help increase the volume of digital payments to help address small-economy constraints and enhance the business opportunities for the private sector. In this context, the Digital Economy Project, which is currently in its preparatory phase, would support digital transformation of key services provided by ECCU Governments. Early introduction of a digital ID is needed to support these initiatives.

10.  The digital currency pilot project, launched by the ECCB, should proceed cautiously as planned. The authorities view the digital currency as an option to reduce excessive reliance on cash and cheques; improve the efficiency of the retail payment system; and support economic development by reducing financial frictions. To contain vulnerabilities, important safeguard measures are embedded in the design of the digital currency, such as the limited size of its holding and transaction values, no interest accrued; and does not include foreign currency transactions. That said, the digital currency could expose the ECCB and the financial system to various risks, including those related to financial intermediation, financial integrity, and cybersecurity. The pilot will provide the opportunity to examine these risks, test the design of the digital currency, and assess any policy gaps. After the pilot, the ECCB is planning to thoroughly review its results, and more work may be warranted, especially to further test the digital currency system, strengthen cybersecurity and AML/CFT operations, and update legal and regulatory frameworks.

 

Source: imf.org
Published: 7 January 2020

As we enter the new decade, Asian countries have firmly established their lead on the Henley Passport Index, the original ranking of all the world’s passports according to the number of destinations their holders can access without a prior visa. For the third consecutive year, Japan has secured the top spot on the index — which is based on exclusive data from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) — with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 191. Singapore holds onto its 2^nd-place position with a score of 190, while South Korea drops down a rank to 3^rd place alongside Germany, giving their passport holders visa-free/visa-on-arrival access to 189 destinations worldwide.

The US and the UK continue their downward trajectory on the index’s rankings. While both countries remain in the top 10, their shared 8^th-place position is a significant decline from the number one spot they jointly held in 2015. Elsewhere in the top 10, Finland and Italy share 4^th place, with a score of 188, while Denmark, Luxembourg, and Spain together hold 5^th place, with a score of 187. The index’s historic success story remains the steady ascent of the UAE, which has climbed a remarkable 47 places over the past 10 years and now sits in 18^th place, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 171. On the other end of the travel freedom spectrum, Afghanistan remains at the bottom of the index, with its nationals only able to visit a mere 26 destinations visa-free.

Dr. Christian H. Kaelin, Chairman of Henley & Partners and the inventor of the passport index concept, says the latest ranking provides a fascinating insight into a rapidly changing world. “Asian countries’ dominance of the top spots is a clear argument for the benefits of open-door policies and the introduction of mutually beneficial trade agreements. Over the past few years, we have seen the world adapt to mobility as a permanent condition of global life. The latest rankings show that the countries that embrace this reality are thriving, with their citizens enjoying ever-increasing passport power and the array of benefits that come with it.”

As ongoing research shows, these benefits are extensive. Using exclusive historical data from the Henley Passport Index, political science researchers Uğur Altundal and Ömer Zarpli, of Syracuse University and the University of Pittsburgh respectively, have found that there is a strongly positive correlation between travel freedom and other kinds of liberties – from the economic to the political, and even individual or human freedoms. Altundal and Zarpli observe that “there’s a distinct correlation between visa freedom and investment freedom, for instance. Similar to trade freedom, countries that rank highly in investment freedom generally have stronger passports. European states such as Austria, Malta, and Switzerland clearly show that countries with a business-friendly environment tend to score highly when it comes to passport power. Likewise, by using the Human Freedom Index, we found a strong correlation between personal freedom and travel freedom.”

Looking ahead: an increasingly pragmatic approach to migration 

While the latest results from the Henley Passport Index show that globally, people are more mobile than ever before, they also indicate a growing divide when it comes to travel freedom, with Japanese passport holders able to access 165 more destinations around the world than Afghan nationals, for example. Analysis of historical data from the index reveals that this extraordinary global mobility gap is the starkest it has been since the index’s inception in 2006.

The impact of these and other key developments is analysed in depth in the 2020 edition of the Henley Passport Index and Global Mobility Report — a unique publication that offers cutting-edge analysis and commentary from leading scholars and professional experts on the latest trends shaping international and regional mobility patterns today.

Commenting in the report, Dr. Parag Khanna, bestselling author and the Founder and Managing Partner of FutureMap in Singapore, notes: “Migration, as with almost everything else, is a function of supply and demand — and, increasingly, it is accepted that more migration creates more demand, stimulating much needed economic growth. As the world economy heads into a synchronized slowdown, we must view migration as part of the solution, not the problem.”

Khanna points out that with the US-China trade war showing no signs of decelerating, Western investment has shifted out of China towards Southeast Asia, bringing a new wave of foreign talent into ASEAN countries that have encouraged greater migration through streamlined visa policies. Thailand’s strong upward movement in the Henley Passport Index’s rankings over the past year is a clear illustration of this emerging trend; benefitting from mutually reciprocal visa waivers, the country has climbed three spots in the past year and now sits in 65^th place, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 78.

Middle Eastern countries have also made strong gains as part of overall efforts to boost trade and tourism. The UAE and Saudi Arabia each climbed four places, while Oman climbed three. Saudi Arabia is now in 66^th place, with citizens able to access 77 destinations around the world without a prior visa, while Oman sits in 64^th place, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 79. Despite these positive regional developments, Dr. Lorraine Charles, Research Associate at the University of Cambridge’s Centre for Business Research, warns that migration and mobility trends in the Middle East are largely driven by conflict, which looks set to continue in 2020. Citing deepening conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and with renewed anti-government protests in Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon, Charles notes that “forced displacement will most likely continue to dominate migration and mobility patterns within the Middle East.”

Brexit, talent migration, and the gap between policy and rhetoric

Following the Conservative government’s landslide victory in the UK late last year, the future of mobility and travel freedom between Britain and the EU remains uncertain. Madeleine Sumption, Director of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, says, “The Conservative government has promised an ‘Australian-style’ points-based system that would be more liberal than current policies towards non-EU citizens, though still much more restrictive than free movement. As with all big migration policy changes, what this will mean for actual levels of mobility, however, remains extremely difficult to predict.” Noting that the looming threat of Brexit has potentially made Britain a less attractive destination for EU citizens, Sumption points out that net EU migration to the UK fell by 59% between 2015 and 2018.

Prof. Simone Bertoli, Professor of Economics at Université Clermont Auvergne (CERDI) in France, says that while countries around the world insist that they are taking steps to attract “the best and the brightest”, a rather different picture is currently emerging: “When it comes to talent migration, a worrying gap between policy and rhetoric has been opening up over the past year. The sluggish improvement of labor market conditions after the 2008 crisis, and the concomitant rise of nativist political parties, is reinforcing the perception of immigration as a threat rather than as an opportunity.”

Citizenship-by-Investment countries retain strong positions

Going into the new year, countries with citizenship-by-investment programs continue to consolidate their positions on the index. Malta sits in 9^th place, with access to 183 destinations around the world, while Montenegro holds on to 46^th place, with a visa-free/visa-on-arrival score of 124. In the Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis and Antigua and Barbuda secure 27^th and 30^th spot, respectively.

Discussing the increasing popularity of investment migration programs for both wealthy investors and the countries that offer them, Dr. Juerg Steffen, CEO of Henley & Partners, says: “Demand for these programs is accelerating, just as the supply has grown globally. The past year has shown that, increasingly, nations and wealthy individuals see investment migration as more than a competitive advantage. Today, it is viewed as an absolute requirement in a volatile world where competition for capital is fierce, and it’s very clear that we will see more of this in 2020.”

 

Source: henleyglobal.com
Published: 7 January 2020

Opinion of the editor:

For the last year and a half, Transparency International (TI) has pressed Portugal’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to share more detailed statistics on the country’s residence by investment program (the ARI, or golden visa) than it currently does. The Ministry has so far dragged its feet, invoking arguments of statistical confidentiality and “internal security secrets”. Now, the Administrative Court of Lisbon has upheld a subpoena filed by TI in April 2018, a ruling that will force the Ministry to publicly disclose an extremely detailed set of statistics.

The Ministry already shares statistics on its golden visa program through the SEF’s monthly releases. These, however, contain only a low-resolution picture of program trends, limited to

• the number of approved applicants and dependents for the top five countries;
• the FDI amounts raised overall by category (real estate or capital transfer);
• the number of visas issued in total and by basis (real estate, capital transfer, or job creation)

IMI has an extensive, longitudinal data-set on the Portuguese program, one we’ve been able to provide only by keeping tabs on, logging, and storing the monthly government releases in our own database; the SEF shares only momentary snapshots of the data and has removed historical data from its website.

TI, meanwhile, has requested a much richer data set. The November 20 ruling – which, according to TI, was only communicated to them last week – obliges the Ministry to provide the following information within 10 days (via TI Portugal):

1. In respect of Investment Residence Permits (ARI):

*a) Total number of visas awarded by geographic distribution of its beneficiaries (Districts + Autonomous Regions)*

b) Total number of visas granted by nationality of beneficiaries;

c) Total number of visas granted by area of activity/investment of the beneficiaries;

*d) Number of investments made not directly by the beneficiaries but by companies controlled by them (in particular as regards real estate investing)*;

e) Number of jobs created by beneficiaries of the programme;

f) Number of applications rejected since the beginning of the programme, broken down by applicants’ country of origin;

*g) Number of visas issued which were subsequently cancelled since the beginning of the programme, broken down by applicants’ country of origin and indicating the reasons for cancellation*;

*h) Number of contacts established with third country authorities to verify data submitted by applicants, broken down by countries contacted*;

i) Annual evolution of data referred to in points (a) to (h);

j) Identification of the companies that created jobs as provided for in paragraph d) of paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3 of the Foreigners Act;

k) Identification of the companies through which the real estate investment was made (sole proprietorship by quotas or joint ownership, pursuant to the provisions of Article 65-A, paragraph 2 of Regulatory Decree No. 9/2018, of September 11).

2. Impact assessments of the programme that have been carried out by or at the request of the Government – or an indication that no impact assessments have been carried out if they do not exist.

3. Regulations indicating what control mechanisms and procedures are in force, namely to establish the origins of the invested capital and to identify the beneficial owners of companies that set up in the country and/or acquire real estate and whose partners benefit from Golden Visas.

The points marked with * correspond to information that the Government has acknowledged does not exist.

Infernal Affairs
The Ministry of Internal Affairs now has its work cut out and will need to devote considerable resources to compiling historical figures.

The editor of IMI has previously argued, in an opinion piece, that out of all the common arguments levied against the investment migration industry, the one that is consistently valid is that which relates to processing unit opacity.

There’s simply no legitimate reason not to be transparent about RCBI program statistics. Opacity invites suspicion. But, as observed with the Malta IIP, even complete and utter program transparency over 70-page statistical reports compiled by an independent regulator does not prevent intransigent detractors (including organizations like TI) from referring to it as “corrupt”, “murky”, and a “security threat”.

“This ruling confirms the elementary right of citizens to question their governments and access information of relevant public interest – a right that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has repeatedly denied to us for almost two years,” said the Vice Chair of Transparency International Portugal, Susana Coroado.

“This information is all the more important, urgent even, since the Golden Visa program has raised criticism and alarm signals from the European Parliament, the European Commission and more recently the European Economic and Social Committee, because of the risks of corruption, money laundering and even the security implications for the EU as a whole,” she added.

Conflicts of interest and tautologies
Coroado neglects to mention that it is largely her own organization that’s been the origin of those claims and the chief emitter of “alarm signals”. They did not arise organically within European political bodies but were fed to them directly by TI, Global Witness, OCCRP and similar outfits. In fact, as exposed by the IMC in October and ignored by all but one media outlet (this one), employees at TI have actually done the leg-work for the European Parliament in preparing reports on the investment migration industry.

In other words, Transparency International itself first wrote the European Economic and Social Committee’s (EESC’s) report on investment migration, and is now effectively saying “look, even the EESC thinks golden visas are a major security and corruption risk”.

While that report was on the drawing board, the IMC sent repeated letters to its nominal authors asking to be included in the consultation process in its capacity as the industry association, one which devotes a tremendous amount of resources to academic research on the topic. These letters were ignored, resulting in a report consisting largely of TI’s pre-digested conclusions, a practice Bruno L’ecuyer, head of the IMC, termed “intellectually disingenuous”.

TI’s pursuit of transparency in investment migration is laudable and valid (at least as long as it is balanced by the equally valid objective of respecting privacy), and IMI, as a publication that dedicates much of its coverage to reporting accurate statistics for IM programs, looks forward to the upcoming cascades of new data for the Portuguese ARI.

But TI should, by the same token, acknowledge the legitimacy of programs that do conform to the highest standards of transparency, such as the Malta IIP. By not doing so, and in fact continuing to lambast the program as if it were purposely obfuscating its internal machinations, TI has shown its hypocritical hand; their motives grow not out of a devotion to the truth but, rather, to a particular political end.

 

Source: imidaily,com
Published: 4 January 2020

 

“THEY WANTED to destroy our industry,” says one of its insiders. “They” are European Union officials. The “industry” is the one selling CRBI schemes—Citizenship and Residence by Investment, that is, a travel document that allows you both to stay somewhere outside your homeland for as long as you want and to travel the world without too many constraints. In 2020 the future of this business will continue to be clouded by the EU’s suspicions and hostility. But the industry will also continue to grow.

Thousands of passports and hundreds of thousands of residence visas are bought every year. Around 100 countries around the world have schemes that offer residence—a “golden visa”—in return for a big investment. A dozen or so go further, and offer a passport, in effect selling citizenship. They include five Caribbean island-states, Vanuatu in the South Pacific, Jordan and several EU members: Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta (Austria has a less formal, and very expensive, scheme). The prices range from $150,000 in Vanuatu to an investment of at least £2m ($2.5m) for a British “Tier-1” investment visa.

The EU’s sensitivities about the business are understandable. Few issues are more central to ideas of national sovereignty than who lives in a country and carries its passport. Yet the EU clearly has an interest if the passport is a European one. And a visa granted by a member of the Schengen internal-border-free area also allows entry to 21 other countries in the EU.

The suspicion is that the schemes are abused by crooks, money-launderers and tax-dodgers. They are dogged by repeated scandals. In 2018 a scam was revealed in Greece, where an entrepreneurial purveyor of residence visas bought properties at market value and sold them at a big mark-up to would-be Chinese migrants (and then partially reimbursed them). In 2019 Bulgaria withdrew the citizenship of a number of investors, either because they had lied about themselves or had failed to make the promised investment, or both.

The EU’s stance matters to non-European countries operating such schemes, since one of the attractions of, for example, Caribbean passports is that most offer visa-free access to the Schengen countries. Even a requirement, to be introduced in 2021, for visa-free entrants to the EU to pre-register online (to weed out undesirables) is a deterrent for some would-be purchasers.

To defend itself, the passport-and-residence industry deploys a number of arguments. The first is that it is performing stricter due-diligence checks on its customers and easing the lives of fewer criminals. The second is that it is, for some small economies in particular, a useful source of debt-free capital. In Vanuatu the industry is now the largest single source of government revenue. Even within the EU itself, in Malta, where the investment-migration industry comes closest to a simple passport-for-sale model, it claims some of the credit for strong recent economic performance.

The industry also argues that only a tiny minority seek a second national residence for nefarious reasons. Many do so because they fear political or economic unrest, want a foreign education for their children or are simply fed up with the difficulty they have in crossing borders with their own passport. And the number of investment migrants is trivial compared with the millions who cross borders in other ways.

None of these arguments probably weighs as heavily with EU officials as the sheer difficulty of meddling in sovereign countries’ passport and visa regimes. Indeed, 2020 will see demand for the industry’s services grow. China has long been by far the biggest source of investment migrants. But other Asian countries, such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, are also becoming more important markets. So is sub-Saharan Africa. “Through gritted teeth,’’ says the industry insider, the EU has accepted that this line of business is not going to disappear.

Source: economist.com – Simon Long
Published: December 2019

Prime Minister Allen Chastanet has vowed that the best is yet to come for the south of Saint Lucia after the island held its first international horse race on December 13.

The race was held at the Royal Saint Lucia Turf Club making Saint Lucia the newest member of the international horse racing family.

“This signals the official beginning of a wave of positive development in Vieux Fort and surrounding communities,” Chastanet said in relation to the race.

He noted that Saint Lucia is now positioned to be part of the international racing fraternity and a leader in the region.

“We need to continue working now to build upon the goodwill and success of today and also work with our peers around the region to grow this sport and to create more opportunities for Saint Lucians,” he said the day the race was held.

He pointed out that as the track enters its second phase, components of the Citizenship by Investment Program (CIP) will be used.

“As I have repeated, the Horse Racing Track has not been financed by CIP Funds, however as the DSH Group enters into the second phase of development which includes hotels, villas and other types of real estate development, the new Phase will have CIP components,” Chastanet explained.

The prime minister stated that over the next few days the government will be sharing more details on several aspects of the project, describing them as “exciting.”

 

Source: stlucianewsonline.com
Published: 16 December 2019

Egypt cabinet has approved new citizenship law paving way for foreign investors to seek fast track citizenship for investments in the country. The move is part of Egypt’s bid to boost its finances. Under the new citizenship by investment scheme, there are five paths to becoming an Egyptian national:

1. Donation: $250,000 (donation to state treasury, non-refundable)
2. Real Estate Investment: $500,000 (individuals or legal entities)
3. Investment project: $400,000 (foreigner’s share in the project cannot be less than 40%)
4. Bank Deposit: $750,000 (refundable after 5 years in the local currency, without interest)
5. Bank Deposit: $1 million (refundable after 3 years in the local currency, without interest)

The amounts stipulated in the 4th and 5th items have to be deposited into a special account under the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) treasury.

Prior to the latest rules, foreigners had to live in Egypt for ten consecutive years before applying for naturalization and citizenship, in general, was transferable through a father or mother.

Dual Citizenship: Persons who become naturalized Egyptian citizens may keep their original nationality if the other country permits it.

Egypt Passport Mobility: Egypt ranked No. 168 in the CEOWORLD magazine’s Global Passport Ranking for 2019, with 49 visa-free countries– but not, notably, the United States or the UK.

• Asia: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste.
• Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde Islands, Comores Islands, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
• Oceania: Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Palau Islands, Samoa, and Tuvalu.
• Caribbean: Dominica, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
• Americas: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.
• Middle east: Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Egypt has no visa-free treaty with any major economic powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, India, France, Italy, Brazil, and Canada. Citizenship by investment is a practice and a choice offered for many seeking a second nationality in the countries where they often travel to or have a business in.

Egypt’s economy: Egypt’s economy is projected to grow by 5.8% of GDP in 2020 and to see a growth rate of 5.7% in 2021, according to study. The annual inflation rate is predicted to fall from 13.9 percent in 2019 to 5.9 percent in 2020. Egypt’s tourism is projected to hit a record of $15.1 billion in 2020 and $17.3 billion in 2021.

It also expected an increase in the volume of foreign direct investments to register $6.3 billion in 2020 and $7.3 billion in 2021. It expected that the country’s tax revenues will rise from $43.5 billion in 2019 to $53 billion in 2020 and to $58.6 billion in 2021.

The primary budget surplus will go up by 2.1% of GDP in 2020 and 2.2% in 2021, while the fiscal balance is projected to hit $26.8 billion in 2020 and $27.3 billion in 2021.

It suggested that the foreign debt will recede to 17.2% of GDP in 2020 and to 16.7% in 2021, the country’s foreign reserves will register $43.5 billion in 2020 and $41.7 billion in 2021.

 

Source: ceoworld.biz
Published: 16 December 2019

This report unpacks the key outcomes of the work of the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information over the last 10 years and sets out the next steps.

Read the Report

 

 

 

The head of the international Red Cross has sharply criticised Britain’s policy of stripping the citizenship of people held in Syria after the fall of Islamic State, saying it is “not conducive” to long-term peace in the region.

Peter Maurer said the UK and other western countries also needed to consider repatriating children held with their mothers in Syria’s overcrowded refugee camps – at a time when the UK Home Office has said no more returns of British minors are in the pipeline.

Maurer, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), told the Guardian that he “failed to see” how denying people such as 19-year-old Shamima Begum their nationality would help a crisis made more complex by the recent Turkish invasion.

“There are things which are probably not conducive to a solution and I fail to see at the present moment how stripping citizenship and making people stateless or just pushing or betting on a second nationality which should deal with the issue brings more clarity,” he said.

The UK has repeatedly stripped citizenship from people who travelled over to join Isis where it believes they have a valid second nationality, although Begum – who left east London when she was 15 – has challenged such a decision in the British courts, arguing that she has in fact been rendered stateless.

The invasion of the border areas of Kurdish-dominated north-east Syria in October has led to further population displacement as locals have fled Turkey’s army, estimated by Maurer at “definitely more than 100,000 and probably closer to 200 [thousand]”, and further complicated the region’s humanitarian crisis.

The ICRC had been able to maintain access to al-Hawl, the largest refugee camp in north-east Syria, but said its access to camps and Isis prisons on the frontline had become more difficult. “We haven’t now revisited prisons now under the control of Turkish armed forces,” Maurer added.

But he warned that countries such as the UK that tried to ignore their citizens in the region unfairly increased the burden on Syria and neighbouring Iraq: “They have even more difficulties in terms of infrastructure, security, environment, and therefore we have to start somewhere.”

The ICRC estimated that there were roughly 10,000 to 15,000 families in the refugee camps from 60 to 70 countries, populations that were “overwhelmingly kids, some of them are accompanied by their mothers and some of them are orphans”.

Britain has been largely unwilling to take back children caught up in the conflict, arguing they pose a security risk, although last week the Foreign Office repatriated a small number of orphans for the first time following a special diplomatic mission.

A day later, however, the Home Office said the case was considered highly exceptional and it had no repatriations of children with a parent present in Syria in the pipeline. Save the Children has estimated that about 60 British children remain in the region.

“We are here not to forget about key humanitarian problems,” Maurer said, and added that he wanted to engage “with those governments who are sceptical about taking back their nationals to take a medium- to long-term view”, which he hoped might facilitate returns, particularly of mothers with children.

Isis fighters who needed to be put on trial should either be brought back and put on trial in their home countries, he added, or an arrangement should be struck with local authorities to bring them to courts there. “We do have a final opinion that you can’t detain and retain people without a basic process of law,” Maurer added.

About 60 British men and women remain in prisons or refugee camps in the region. One, Jack Letts, who left the UK to fight for Isis, has remained in detention since 2017 and had his British citizenship stripped, leaving him with the Canadian nationality of his father, while waiting for his situation to be resolved.

 

Source: theguardian.com
Published: 30 November 2019

It was right and proper that Lisa Smith and her daughter be brought back to Ireland as Irish citizens and treated in a humane manner. Depriving so-called Isis brides of citizenship — as the British and Dutch governments have done — renders them stateless and is pointless and self defeating.

It’s bad for security and undermines efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. Islamic State grew partly from the US policy of keeping large numbers of extremists in a detention camp in Iraq. This allowed many Islamic State leaders to meet and plan their murderous strategies.

It also helped them to radicalise tens of thousands and helped create, at its height, an army of more than 70,000 fighters.

It’s bad for international law. Seeking to deprive someone of citizenship simply because they are problematical risks violating international legal obligations. It also sparks of colonialism.

It’s bad for gender equality. Prosecuting male returnees while refusing even to repatriate female ones, effectively gives women far less chance of defending themselves in a court of law than their male counterparts.

It is bad for the rights of children. As has happened with British and Dutch women, making them stateless has also made their children stateless, resulting in them spending their formative years in detention camps in Syria and Turkey.

As for Ms Smith, it was right and proper that she be taken immediately into Garda custody for questioning over her conduct when she joined the caliphate in Syria.

In the days, weeks, and months ahead, it will also be right that she be kept under close surveillance in Ireland in order to determine whether she poses any real threat to our security.

She has said repeatedly that she never fought with Isis yet it is established that she travelled to Syria during the Syrian civil war to join IS, reportedly marrying — and later divorcing — four Muslim men, among them IS fighter Sajid Aslam, who, she claims, is the father of her two-year-old daughter.

Neither has she at any stage made a strong, unequivocal condemnation of IS. In an interview last July with journalist Norma Costello for RTÉ, she spoke mainly of disappointment and anger.

“It wasn’t worth it. We failed,” she said.

“We actually thought it was going to be an Islamic State … and we would all be joined as one and be very happy. It didn’t happen.”

In the interview held at a detention camp in Syria, she also denied training young girls in how to handle weapons, even though as a former Irish soldier, she was well experienced in weaponry.

She claims she never participated in fighting, but photos have emerged of her posing with weapons in Tunisia.

Most disturbing of all, though, is her refusal to accept that her decision to go to Syria was in any way the result of holding extreme or radical views.

 

Source: irishexaminer.com
Published:  2 December 2019